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Abstract
Background: With the exception of M. tuberculosis, little has been published on the problems of
cross-contamination in bacteriology laboratories. We performed a retrospective analysis of
subtyping data from the National Salmonella Reference Laboratory (Ireland) from 2000–2007 to
identify likely incidents of laboratory cross contamination.
Methods: Serotyping and antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed on all Salmonella
isolates received in the NSRL. Phage typing was performed on all S. Typhimurium and S. Enteritidis
isolates while multi-locus variance analysis (MLVA) was performed on selected S. Typhimurium
isolates. Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) using the PulseNet standard protocol was
performed on selected isolates of various serovars.
Results: Twenty-three incidents involving fifty-six isolates were identified as likely to represent
cross contamination. The probable sources of contamination identified were the laboratory
positive control isolate (n = 13), other test isolates (n = 9) or proficiency test samples (n = 1).
Conclusion: The scale of laboratory cross-contamination in bacteriology is most likely under
recognized. Testing laboratories should be aware of the potential for cross-contamination,
regularly review protocols to minimize its occurrence and consider it as a possibility when
unexpected results are obtained.
Background
Laboratory contamination can be defined as the inadvert-
ent addition of analytes to test samples during sample col-
lection, transportation or analysis. There is a high level of
awareness of the potential for cross contamination when
using nucleic acid amplification methods [1]. Although
conventional microbial culture also represents amplifica-
tion of signal to detectable levels there is relatively little
systematic data on the frequency of cross contamination
in conventional microbiology. In clinical laboratories
cross contamination can lead to misdiagnosis of patients,
inappropriate treatment or isolation of patients and inves-
tigation of pseudo-outbreaks. Detection of pathogens in
food items can lead to very significant economic loss [2]
therefore it is important to ensure that positive results
reflect true product contamination.
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Sources of microbial laboratory contamination may
include positive control strains, cultures of recent isolates,
laboratory workers and airborne exogenous material such
as fungal spores. Pseudo-outbreaks due to cross-contami-
nation of patient samples have been reported with
Aspergillus niger [3] and Vancomycin Resistant Enterococci
(VRE) [4] however most of the existing literature relates to
M. tuberculosis. Various studies have shown that the rates
of false positive results due to cross-contamination by M.
tuberculosis varies from 0.33 to 8.6% [5] with contamina-
tion reported to occur most commonly during the initial
processing of specimens [6]. The change in use from solid
media to more sensitive, automated broth cultures has
increased sensitivity and shortened the time to detection
but has also led to increased numbers of false positives
[5]. Other factors reported to be responsible for contami-
nation include clerical errors, spillages and splashes, aero-
sol formation [7], contamination of equipment used to
dispense reagents [8], use of automatic pipettes [9], and
new or poorly trained staff.
Laboratory cross contamination is more likely to be sus-
pected in the context of a series of isolates of an uncom-
mon strain clustered in time. In the case of commonly
isolated bacteria sporadic or intermittent contamination
may be entirely unsuspected. For example isolation of Sta-
phylococcus aureus or Salmonella enterica from 2 or more
specimens in a short period of time is not an uncommon
event. In the absence of detailed subtyping of common
species to allow recognition of relationships between iso-
lates cross contamination may go undetected. As a result
of detailed sub-typing of Salmonella enterica isolates and
liaison with service users we became aware of a number of
incidents of probable laboratory cross contamination.
Here we present a review of our data and records of liaison
over a period of 8 years to emphasise the scale of this
problem and the role of reference laboratories in detec-
tion and investigation of suspected laboratory contamina-
tion.
Results
Summary of Results
Twenty-three incidents of probable laboratory cross con-
tamination involving fifty-six isolates were identified.
Food laboratories accounted for the majority of incidents
(n = 20) with just 3 incidents associated with human clin-
ical samples. Contamination with the laboratory positive
control isolate accounted for the majority of suspected
incidents (n = 13) while contamination with other test
isolates (n = 9) or proficiency test samples (n = 1)
accounted for the remainder (Additional file 1). Two spe-
cific food laboratories accounted for 4 contamination
incidents each. MLVA proved a useful technique in detec-
tion of incidents involving S. Typhimurium (Table 1). The
use of 5 separate loci for PCR amplification gives an allele
string which results in good discrimination, even among
closely related isolates.
Below is a description of 3 of the 23 incidents.
Case 1
A review of our databases showed that from October 2003
to April 2004 11/30 (37%) of isolates received from an
accredited private food laboratory (Lab A) were identified
as S. Typhimurium DT132 (Additional file 1). The isolates
were stated to have originated from unrelated food prod-
ucts including beef (n = 7), pork (n = 2), a drain swab (n
= 1) and powder (n = 1). When submitted the laboratory
Table 1: Case 3 – Molecular Analysis of S. Typhimurium PT Untypable, ASSuT isolates in NSRL databases.
Isolate no Year Lab Source PFGE MLVA
XbaI BlnI
03–0407 2003 D Human B A 05-02-07-14-02
05–0802 2005 E Human A A 04-03-10-02-02
05–0900 2005 E Dairy product B A 04-04-11-00-02
05–0902 2005 E Swine B A 04-04-11-00-02
07–0146 2007 E Dairy product A B 04-03-11-02-02
07–0237 2007 E Swine A B 04-03-11-02-02
07–0200 2007 L Pork C C 05-02-07-00-02
07–0201 2007 L Unknown B A 04-03-07-02-02
07–0204 2007 L Unknown A A 04-04-16-21-02
07–0028 2007 L Pork A A 04-03-10-02-02
07–0060 2007 L Pork A A 04-03-10-02-02
07–0174 2007 L Swine A A 04-03-11-02-02
Investigation of a suspected contamination incident involving 07–0146, a S. Typhimurium, PT Untypable, resistance profile ASSuT, isolated from a 
dairy product involved molecular analysis of all isolates sharing this isolates phenotype (n = 12). PFGE with XbaI digestion showed the isolates to be 
closely related, e.g. patterns A and B were 92.8% similar while C was 89% similar to A. All isolates were indistinguishable with BlnI digestion apart 
from 07–0146 and 07–0237 (86% similarity) and 07–0200. MLVA provided further evidence that the Salmonella isolated from the dairy product was 
in fact contamination from swine isolate 07–0237.
The 2005 Lab E dairy isolate (05–0900) differed from 07–0146 but was indistinguishable from a swine isolate (05–0902) from Lab E which was 
isolated at the same time.BMC Microbiology 2009, 9:155 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/9/155
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quality control strain was also S. Typhimurium DT132.
Following discussion with the sending laboratory no fur-
ther S. Typhimurium DT132 isolates were received from
this laboratory.
Case 2
This incident occurred in the Clinical Microbiology
department of a teaching hospital (Lab C) [10]. A stool
sample from a 78 year old female patient was submitted
for analysis. No colonies resembling Salmonella  were
observed on the primary culture plates however Salmo-
nella was isolated on day two following subculture of the
selenite broth to xylose lysine deoxycholate (XLD) agar.
The isolate was typed as S. Enteritidis PT1, with resistance
to nalidixic acid. Another S. Enteritidis PT1 with resistance
to nalidixic acid was isolated during the same 2 day period
in the same laboratory from a female patient with a his-
tory of profuse diarrhoea associated with travel outside of
Ireland and requiring hospital admission. The 78 year old
female patient had been a hospital inpatient on naso-gas-
tric feeding for an extended period prior to isolation of
Salmonella. The clinical history was of a brief episode of
loose stool and all subsequent specimens were negative
for Salmonella.
Case 3
An accredited private food laboratory (Lab E) submitted
an isolate (07–0146) of Salmonella stated to have been
isolated from a dairy product (Additional file 1). The lab-
oratory had been testing swine samples at the time of this
isolation and suspected cross-contamination. The isolate
typed as S. Typhimurium, was untypable by phage typing,
i.e. did not react with any of the typing phages, and was
resistant to ampicillin, streptomycin, sulphonamide and
tetracycline (ASSuT). A literature review showed that this
phenotype was associated with swine [11]. As part of the
investigation we asked the laboratory to forward all their
group B Salmonella isolates (n = 51) from that year for typ-
ing. Serotyping divided these isolates into 6 different sero-
types including 17 S. Typhimurium isolates. Phage typing
and antimicrobial susceptibility testing subdivided the 17
S. Typhimurium isolates into 10 phenotypes, of which a
single isolate, 07–0237, matched 07–0146, i.e. phage
untypable and ASSuT resistance. This isolate from pork
predated the isolate from the dairy product and we sus-
pected this to be the source of contamination.
We searched our databases since 2000 and identified 10
additional isolates with this phenotype. These included 2
human faecal isolates, 2 from unknown food sources, 5
from porcine sources and an isolate from a dairy product
from 2005 from the same laboratory involved in this inci-
dent (Table 1). We performed molecular subtyping on
these isolates to determine the likelihood of their having
coming from the same source.
PFGE using XbaI showed most of the isolates to be closely
related. However digestion with BlnI differentiated 07–
0146 (Figure 1) and 07–0237 (data not shown) from the
other isolates. MLVA separated the 12 isolates into 7 types
(Table 1). Isolates 07–0146 and 07–0237 and a third
recent porcine isolate from another laboratory were indis-
tinguishable by MLVA. This group of 3 isolates were dis-
tinguishable from the remaining 9 isolates with the
shared phenotype. This provided further proof that the
isolation of 07–0146 from the dairy product resulted
from a laboratory contamination incident.
Discussion
There is very general recognition of the risk of laboratory
cross contamination in nucleic acid amplification assays.
Although airborne molecular contamination is one possi-
bility contamination may also be as a result of direct or
indirect contact contamination. Although direct and indi-
rect contact contamination are no less likely in conven-
tional culture there is limited emphasis in recent literature
on the occurrence and control of this problem. The extent
of the problem of laboratory cross contamination is diffi-
cult to determine. Recognised incidents are generally not
reported and it is likely that many if not most incidents are
not recognised since sporadic contamination is unlikely
to be suspected when it results in the isolation of a com-
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) profiles of represent- ative S. Typhimurium, PT Untypable, ASSuT isolates digested  with BlnI Figure 1
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) profiles of 
representative S. Typhimurium, PT Untypable, 
ASSuT isolates digested with BlnI. Lane 1, H9812 (S. 
Braenderup control), lane 2, 03–0407, lane 3, 05–0802, lane 
4, 05–0900, lane 5, H9812 (S. Braenderup control), lane 6, 
05–0902, lane 7, 07–0028, lane 8, 07–0060, lane 9, 07–0146, 
lane 10, H9812 (S. Braenderup control), lane 11, 07–0174, 
lane 12, 07–0200, lane 13, 07–0201, lane 14, 07–0204, lane 
15, H9812 (S. Braenderup control). PFGE with both XbaI and 
BlnI was performed on all isolates with same phenotype as 
isolate 07–0146. Digestion with BlnI proved more discrimina-
tory showing 07–0146 and 07–0237 to be indistinguishable 
from each other and different from other isolates in our col-
lection.
 1     2     3      4     5     6      7     8      9     10   11    12    13   14    15 BMC Microbiology 2009, 9:155 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/9/155
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mon organism from a specific source (e.g. S. aureus from
a wound swab or Salmonella enterica from uncooked
pork). Contamination is more likely to be considered
when an organism is isolated from an uncommon source
and when detailed typing of isolates of a specific species
allows recognition of relationships not otherwise
detected. This report suggests that laboratory cross con-
tamination with Salmonella is not rare, particularly in food
laboratories. Contamination with the laboratory positive
control strain accounted for the majority of recognised
false positive isolations in this study. Discussions with our
client laboratories showed a variety of positive control
strains were used including S. Alachua, S. Poona, S. Sal-
ford and S. Typhimurium. For practical purposes positive
control strains should have an easily detectable pheno-
typic marker. The Oxoid manual recommends S. Typh-
imurium ATCC 14028 for the quality control of selenite
broth and XLD agar and S. Poona NCTC 4840 for the
quality control of bismuth sulphite agar [12]. The use of
these strains as laboratory positive controls should not be
recommended.  S. Typhimurium is commonly isolated
from many animal sources and is the second most com-
mon serotype isolated from humans worldwide [13]. S.
Poona, although not as common a human pathogen as S.
Typhimurium, has been associated with outbreaks and
infections linked to reptiles [14] and cantaloupes [15].
The Health Protection Agency in the UK recommends the
use of Salmonella Nottingham NCTC 7382 (16:d:e, n, z15)
as a control strain [16]. S. Nottingham is an extremely rare
serovar so if it is isolated contamination would immedi-
ately be suspected.
While our report deals specifically with Salmonella enterica
there is no reason to believe that the problem is peculiar
to this species. The risk of unrecognised cross contamina-
tion is probably greatest when the isolation process
involved an enrichment step in a broth. This is a standard
element in most procedures for isolation of bacteria from
food. Cross contamination of solid media may be sus-
pected on the basis that there is only one or a small
number of colonies on the plate or the colonies may not
be distributed in the expected way given the pattern of
inoculation of the plate. There are no such visual clues
from broth contamination.
It is apparent that cross contamination is also a significant
problem with M. tuberculosis. Criteria for definition of a false
positive  M. tuberculosis incident have been published [7]
although have not been universally accepted [17]. It is rea-
sonable to suppose that there is also a risk of cross contami-
nation with broth cultures of other species of bacteria.
Cross contamination should be suspected when a test iso-
late is indistinguishable from the laboratory positive con-
trol strain or a proficiency test isolate. Contamination
should also be suspected if Salmonella is isolated from a
specimen type which is rarely positive for that species/
group of organism. Laboratories need to be aware that a
false positive due to contamination does not always occur
in an obvious time frame or sequence with a recent posi-
tive culture. There may be number of negative samples
between the true positive culture and associated cross con-
taminated specimens. This has regularly been observed
with M. tuberculosis contamination [5]. A study in Finland
associated the use of automatic pipettes with an increased
rate of Salmonella  contamination in the laboratory [9].
However in our discussion with laboratories new staff and
mislabelling of broths and plates were the commonly
identified explanations for cross contamination.
Conclusion
Standard laboratory precautions and routine hygiene and
staff training are clearly important in reducing the risk of
cross contamination but these measures may not be suffi-
cient. In our laboratory we perform routine environmen-
tal monitoring for Salmonella to ensure that cleaning is of
the required standard.
We suggest the following additional measures should be
considered. Positive control strains should be processed
and incubated in different areas from the test samples.
With respect to food laboratories we suggest that speci-
mens that are rarely positive for Salmonella (e.g. ready to
eat foods and processed dairy products) should be proc-
essed at separate times, with separate equipment and if
possible in separate rooms or benches from specimens
that are relatively commonly positive for Salmonella (e.g.
uncooked pork). We consider that broth cultures repre-
sent a particularly high risk for cross contamination of
other media or the environment and therefore broth cul-
tures should be sub-cultured to solid media in a desig-
nated area demarcated from areas where primary cultures
are inoculated and if pipettors are used these should be
dedicated to broth subculture. Use of aerosol resistant
pipettor tips may be a useful additional precaution [9].
Manufacturers submitting samples of products for testing
for Salmonella or other pathogens would be wise to retain
a sample for each lot/batch tested for retest in the event of
an unexpected positive result particularly in the case of
products where a positive may lead to product recall and
adverse publicity.
Methods
Isolates
Between 2000 and 2007 the National Salmonella Refer-
ence Laboratory (Ireland) received 7733 isolates of Salmo-
nella enterica for typing. Isolates were from both human (n
= 3687) and animal/food (n = 4046) sources.BMC Microbiology 2009, 9:155 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/9/155
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Serotyping
Salmonella isolates were assigned serotypes according to
the Kauffmann-Whyte typing scheme using slide aggluti-
nation with standard antisera (Sifin Institute, Berlin, Ger-
many, Murex Biotech Ltd., Dartford, England, and Dade-
Behring Gmbh, Marburg, Germany).
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed
according to the disk diffusion method of the Clinical and
Laboratory Standards Institute [18] (CLSI). The following
antimicrobial agents (disk contents indicated in parenthe-
ses) were tested: ampicillin (10 μg), chloramphenicol (30
μg), streptomycin (10 μg), sulfonamides (300 μg), tetra-
cycline (30 μg), trimethoprim (5 μg), nalidixic acid (30
μg), kanamycin (30 μg), ciprofloxacin (5 μg), ceftazidime
(30  μg), gentamicin (10 μg) and minocycline (30 μg)
(OXOID, Hampshire, United Kingdom). Escherichia coli
ATCC 25922 was used as the control.
Phage typing
Phage typing of S. Typhimurium and S. Enteritidis isolates
was performed in accordance with the methods of the
Laboratory of Enteric Pathogens, Health Protection
Agency, Colindale, London, United Kingdom [19,20].
Pulsed field gel electrophoresis
Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) using the PulseNet
standard protocol [21] was performed on selected iso-
lates. DNA was digested using restriction enzymes XbaI
(Roche, Basel, Switzerland) and BlnI (Sigma-Aldrich, Dor-
set, England) and DNA fragments were separated using
the CHEF Mapper XA (Bio-Rad, California) system.
Multi-locus variance analysis
Multi-locus variable-number tandem-repeats analysis
(MLVA) using the method of Linstedt et al. [22] was per-
formed on selected S. Typhimurium isolates. DNA was
extracted using Qiaqen QIAamp mini kit (Qiagen, West
Sussex, UK) and PCR was performed with flouresent
primers (Sigma-Genosys, Suffolk, UK) using Qiagen Mul-
tiplex PCR master mix kit (Qiagen) on a GeneAmp PCR
system 9700 thermal cycler (Applied Biosystems, Chesire,
UK). Fragments were separated using a Beckman Coulter
CEQ™ 8000 DNA analysis system (Beckmann-Coulter,
Fullerton, CA).
Review of records
The collection of isolates and our records were reviewed to
identify possible episodes of laboratory cross contamina-
tion and sending laboratories were contacted to request
submission of quality control strains (where not previ-
ously submitted) and to discuss the possibility of cross
contamination.
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